Posted by: Anonymous
The Truth Will Out - 07/04/02 08:50 AM
The following is from "Online Journal" and is a synopsis/review of "
Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth [/b] ", a book which has been a best seller in France and which the Il Duce regime has tried to stop from being published in the United States. Nation Books, the publishing arm of the highly respected "The Nation" has decided, though, to publish it in September. The public relations plan to discredit the book has begun and is expected to intensify.
Is there truth to this? Perhaps one has to look at what has happened since the book was published and then each can make his/her own judgement.
1. The man the Il Duce Regime installed as the interim head of the Afgan government has deep ties to the American oil industry.
2. The American representative to Afganistan appointed by the Il Duce Regime was a high executive in an American oil firm.
3. Outside of seeking international aid, the only significant foreign policy action by the new Afgan government during the interim when its primary goal was to pacify and rebuild the country was to announce that the pipeline is a major goal for the Afgan government.
4. The Afgan government has stated that it wants Unocal to build the pipeline which was being negotiated and was then rejected by The Taliban --even though a Brazilian firm also had bid on it with a lower price and more revenues to Afganistan.
5. The Il Duce Regime took a very active role the recent Afganistan meeting which selected the permanent government, working to ensure that the man it installed as the Interim Leader would be named the permanent leader.
Now on with the synopsis:
Quick take on "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth"
By John Emerson
Online Journal Guest Reviewer
February 1, 2002—Ben Laden: La Verite Interdite ("Bin Laden: the Forbidden Truth") by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie is a well-researched piece of mainstream French journalism. It is not a scandal-mongering knockoff—in some places it is so well documented as to be tedious. Besides ample research in print media, the authors received information from disgruntled US sources, together with the French and (presumably) the Israeli intelligence services.
While most of this book seems convincing to me, I am not able to give it an expert critique. I am here merely presenting the most interesting points I found in my reading of this as-yet untranslated book. (The failure to publish an English translation of this French bestseller is a chilling reminder of the degree of corporate control of American corporate media. For those who read French, the book can be bought from Amazon.fr, express mail, for about $32.)
This book is terribly damaging to Saudi Arabia and only slightly less so to the oil industry, US strategic planners, and of course the Bushes. The big story is that Saudi Arabia has been heavily funding fundamentalist Islam, including terrorism, for some time (starting not long after the phony 1973 oil crisis, when their revenues quickly multiplied eightfold). In the Afghan war against the Soviets, massive amounts of both US and (especially) Saudi money went to fund fundamentalist militants, who by 1994 (after the defeat of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Afghanistan) directed their hostility to the US. (During the Soviet Afghan war the US was quite friendly to these militants, but they were primarily funded by the Saudis and the Gulf States rather than by the US. And the Saudis had their own agenda in Afghanistan and elsewhere).
Saudi support for fundamentalism comes from members of the establishment, and is distributed through an extremely complex and sophisticated commercial and financial network. (Offshore banks and shell companies used by rich Westerners and large multinationals to hide and transfer funds are equally useful to terrorists—not to mention drug lords.) The bin Ladens and the allied Mahfouz clan are the dominant economic powers in Saudi Arabia. Their influence internally is on a par with that of the Saudi royal family and the Wahhabite religious establishment, but since the two latter groups are ill-equipped to deal with the modern world, these two clans effectively control Saudi Arabia. (Clans like this are the archaic Saudi equivalents of corporations in a secular society. The holdings of the bin Laden clan and of the Mahfouz clan both rank among the top 100 private fortunes in the world).
Since Saudi Arabia is one of the most secretive nations in the world, it is impossible to be sure that everyone in the Saudi establishment has completely cut off its ties with Osama Bin Laden, and there are good reasons to believe that many have not. Despite his present disgrace and loss of Saudi citizenship, Osama has much high-level support in Saudi Arabia, and many are waiting for him to return and reform the corrupt Saudi government on fundamentalist grounds. In Saudi Arabia, family connections are everything and the formal central power is extraordinarily weak. It is a mark of the influence of the bin Laden family that Osama's brother Mahrouz, who participated in the 1979 attack on the grand mosque in Mecca (an attack aimed at the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy), was the only one of 500 attackers who was not executed. (He works to this day in a family business in Medina).
For more than a decade, oil companies have been interested in a pipeline across Afghanistan, which would give convenient access to Central Asian oil. The oil companies have no real interest in social conditions in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else as long as they get their oil, and they were at all times perfectly willing to work with the Taliban or anyone else who could ensure stability in Afghanistan. Since US foreign policy is driven more by oil than anything else, direct and proxy negotiations with the Taliban continued almost without a break from its coming to power in 1994 until August 2001 (a month before the WTC attack).
The book does not say so, but it can be deduced that the WTC attack was a preemptive strike by bin Laden intended to make it impossible for the Taliban to betray him and cut a deal with the US.
A few main points in conclusion. First, from the evidence presented here, the death of Osama bin Laden would have no disastrous impact on the activities of al Qaeda. Its financial structures and networks of militants are still in place, and al Qaeda was never financed primarily by bin Laden's personal fortune. Bin Laden will become a martyred hero, and someone else will take his place. The roots of al Qaeda are to be found in Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and the Sudan are only the hapless proxies of our Saudi friends.
With regard to George W. Bush, we may not have the "smoking gun" here, but the protectiveness of the oilmen and the foreign policy establishment toward the Saudis played a major role in getting us in the mess we're in now. Since the two Bushes who occupied the White House were both oilmen and part of the foreign policy establishment, they cannot escape blame. (Bush the Younger, of course, who couldn't name Pakistan's leader a year ago and laughed at people who thought he should be able to, is part of the foreign policy establishment by birth and ex-officio, rather than by training or competence).
While there is no real evidence in this book for specific Bush foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks, we can be sure that they were not as big a surprise as is claimed. Combined with other information about a hands-off FBI policy on domestic terrorism and the return of the entire bin Laden family to Saudi Arabia (without being questioned) at a time when most US airports were locked down, it still can reasonably be suspected that the Bush administration knew that it had something to hide, that it knew that some kind of attack was in the works, and that it was waiting for a pretext to go to war.
Even without any conspiracy theories at all, however, we can see that the administration's public account of these attacks is fraudulent. The roots of the recent Afghan war were not in 9/11. They were the result of the failure of six months of negotiations with the Taliban (ending two to four weeks before the attacks) intended to secure a US-controlled pipeline. US foreign policy, especially under the Bushes, is entirely realistic in the most cynical sense of that term. Early in 2001, the Bush administration laid plans to get that pipeline one way or another. When the diplomatic efforts failed (to put it mildly), the war policy (which was already in place as an option) was put in effect. This war policy has no intrinsic limits and at this point we can only sit and watch it develop.
Is there truth to this? Perhaps one has to look at what has happened since the book was published and then each can make his/her own judgement.
1. The man the Il Duce Regime installed as the interim head of the Afgan government has deep ties to the American oil industry.
2. The American representative to Afganistan appointed by the Il Duce Regime was a high executive in an American oil firm.
3. Outside of seeking international aid, the only significant foreign policy action by the new Afgan government during the interim when its primary goal was to pacify and rebuild the country was to announce that the pipeline is a major goal for the Afgan government.
4. The Afgan government has stated that it wants Unocal to build the pipeline which was being negotiated and was then rejected by The Taliban --even though a Brazilian firm also had bid on it with a lower price and more revenues to Afganistan.
5. The Il Duce Regime took a very active role the recent Afganistan meeting which selected the permanent government, working to ensure that the man it installed as the Interim Leader would be named the permanent leader.
Now on with the synopsis:
Quick take on "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth"
By John Emerson
Online Journal Guest Reviewer
February 1, 2002—Ben Laden: La Verite Interdite ("Bin Laden: the Forbidden Truth") by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie is a well-researched piece of mainstream French journalism. It is not a scandal-mongering knockoff—in some places it is so well documented as to be tedious. Besides ample research in print media, the authors received information from disgruntled US sources, together with the French and (presumably) the Israeli intelligence services.
While most of this book seems convincing to me, I am not able to give it an expert critique. I am here merely presenting the most interesting points I found in my reading of this as-yet untranslated book. (The failure to publish an English translation of this French bestseller is a chilling reminder of the degree of corporate control of American corporate media. For those who read French, the book can be bought from Amazon.fr, express mail, for about $32.)
This book is terribly damaging to Saudi Arabia and only slightly less so to the oil industry, US strategic planners, and of course the Bushes. The big story is that Saudi Arabia has been heavily funding fundamentalist Islam, including terrorism, for some time (starting not long after the phony 1973 oil crisis, when their revenues quickly multiplied eightfold). In the Afghan war against the Soviets, massive amounts of both US and (especially) Saudi money went to fund fundamentalist militants, who by 1994 (after the defeat of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Afghanistan) directed their hostility to the US. (During the Soviet Afghan war the US was quite friendly to these militants, but they were primarily funded by the Saudis and the Gulf States rather than by the US. And the Saudis had their own agenda in Afghanistan and elsewhere).
Saudi support for fundamentalism comes from members of the establishment, and is distributed through an extremely complex and sophisticated commercial and financial network. (Offshore banks and shell companies used by rich Westerners and large multinationals to hide and transfer funds are equally useful to terrorists—not to mention drug lords.) The bin Ladens and the allied Mahfouz clan are the dominant economic powers in Saudi Arabia. Their influence internally is on a par with that of the Saudi royal family and the Wahhabite religious establishment, but since the two latter groups are ill-equipped to deal with the modern world, these two clans effectively control Saudi Arabia. (Clans like this are the archaic Saudi equivalents of corporations in a secular society. The holdings of the bin Laden clan and of the Mahfouz clan both rank among the top 100 private fortunes in the world).
Since Saudi Arabia is one of the most secretive nations in the world, it is impossible to be sure that everyone in the Saudi establishment has completely cut off its ties with Osama Bin Laden, and there are good reasons to believe that many have not. Despite his present disgrace and loss of Saudi citizenship, Osama has much high-level support in Saudi Arabia, and many are waiting for him to return and reform the corrupt Saudi government on fundamentalist grounds. In Saudi Arabia, family connections are everything and the formal central power is extraordinarily weak. It is a mark of the influence of the bin Laden family that Osama's brother Mahrouz, who participated in the 1979 attack on the grand mosque in Mecca (an attack aimed at the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy), was the only one of 500 attackers who was not executed. (He works to this day in a family business in Medina).
For more than a decade, oil companies have been interested in a pipeline across Afghanistan, which would give convenient access to Central Asian oil. The oil companies have no real interest in social conditions in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else as long as they get their oil, and they were at all times perfectly willing to work with the Taliban or anyone else who could ensure stability in Afghanistan. Since US foreign policy is driven more by oil than anything else, direct and proxy negotiations with the Taliban continued almost without a break from its coming to power in 1994 until August 2001 (a month before the WTC attack).
The book does not say so, but it can be deduced that the WTC attack was a preemptive strike by bin Laden intended to make it impossible for the Taliban to betray him and cut a deal with the US.
A few main points in conclusion. First, from the evidence presented here, the death of Osama bin Laden would have no disastrous impact on the activities of al Qaeda. Its financial structures and networks of militants are still in place, and al Qaeda was never financed primarily by bin Laden's personal fortune. Bin Laden will become a martyred hero, and someone else will take his place. The roots of al Qaeda are to be found in Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and the Sudan are only the hapless proxies of our Saudi friends.
With regard to George W. Bush, we may not have the "smoking gun" here, but the protectiveness of the oilmen and the foreign policy establishment toward the Saudis played a major role in getting us in the mess we're in now. Since the two Bushes who occupied the White House were both oilmen and part of the foreign policy establishment, they cannot escape blame. (Bush the Younger, of course, who couldn't name Pakistan's leader a year ago and laughed at people who thought he should be able to, is part of the foreign policy establishment by birth and ex-officio, rather than by training or competence).
While there is no real evidence in this book for specific Bush foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks, we can be sure that they were not as big a surprise as is claimed. Combined with other information about a hands-off FBI policy on domestic terrorism and the return of the entire bin Laden family to Saudi Arabia (without being questioned) at a time when most US airports were locked down, it still can reasonably be suspected that the Bush administration knew that it had something to hide, that it knew that some kind of attack was in the works, and that it was waiting for a pretext to go to war.
Even without any conspiracy theories at all, however, we can see that the administration's public account of these attacks is fraudulent. The roots of the recent Afghan war were not in 9/11. They were the result of the failure of six months of negotiations with the Taliban (ending two to four weeks before the attacks) intended to secure a US-controlled pipeline. US foreign policy, especially under the Bushes, is entirely realistic in the most cynical sense of that term. Early in 2001, the Bush administration laid plans to get that pipeline one way or another. When the diplomatic efforts failed (to put it mildly), the war policy (which was already in place as an option) was put in effect. This war policy has no intrinsic limits and at this point we can only sit and watch it develop.